After the Biosecure Act was passed, the U.S. attitude toward China’s biomedical industry did not converge—instead, an even more pronounced internal rift emerged. On one side, Congress and some policy forces believe the current restrictions are insufficient and are attempting to further incorporate Chinese biomedicine into investment review frameworks, clinical data review frameworks, and supply chain security frameworks. On the other side, industry players and some policy researchers have begun to worry that continued expansion of restrictions will not enhance U.S. innovation capacity, but may instead push up drug development costs, weaken startup efficiency, and disrupt the global R&D outsourcing system built over the past two decades.
This schism is not simply pro-China or anti-China, nor is it a PR controversy over any single company. It reflects the real predicament of the U.S. biopharma industry amid changes in the global landscape: Chinese companies are transitioning from outsourced service providers to sources of innovative drug assets. The U.S. wants to reduce its dependence on China, yet it cannot easily escape China’s role in the global drug discovery, development, and manufacturing system.
Political End: Biosecure Is Not Enough—Restrictions Must Be Expanded
A considerable portion of China hawks in the U.S. Congress believe that the Biosecure Act is merely a first step—or even a weakened compromise. Earlier versions of the bill attempted to more broadly restrict U.S. pharmaceutical companies from cooperating with specific Chinese enterprises, but the final version primarily focused on government contracts and provided companies with a five-year transition period. This outcome left some lawmakers dissatisfied.
As a result, new policy directions have begun to emerge. One important line of thinking is to incorporate biomedicine into a stricter outbound investment review framework. The original Comprehensive Outbound Investment National Security Act primarily focused on sensitive areas such as AI and computer technology, with biotechnology not included in its core scope. But now, some U.S. lawmakers hope to add drug development, biologics manufacturing, clinical R&D, and other areas to the review list, restricting U.S. capital from continuing to support China’s biopharma industry.
The logic behind this thinking is clear: if Chinese companies are no longer just contract manufacturers but can instead export innovative drug assets to the world, then simply restricting government contracts is no longer sufficient. Capital, clinical trials, manufacturing, data, and supply chains could all be viewed as part of strategic competition.
Clinical data is another potential area for restriction. Some U.S. congressional reports have already proposed that the FDA should not accept clinical trial data from China, citing reasons such as inadequate regulatory oversight, unverifiable patient protection standards, and questionable data independence. Although such reports do not have direct legal force, the policy signal they send is clear: the acceptability of Chinese clinical data in U.S. registration pathways may face heightened political scrutiny in the future.
This represents the first attitude within the U.S.: treating Chinese biomedicine as a strategic competitor and believing that legal, regulatory, and funding review mechanisms must be used to curb its global expansion.
Industry Response: Restricting China Will Not Automatically Make the U.S. Stronger
In contrast to the hardline political stance, a different voice exists within the U.S. biopharma industry. They do not deny the strategic competition between the U.S. and China, nor do they deny that supply chain security needs to be managed. But they are more concerned about one question: if the U.S. only knows how to restrict China but cannot improve its own innovation environment, American companies may end up being the ones hurt.
This concern is not unfounded. The pace of internationalization of China’s biopharma industry has not slowed because of Biosecure. In 2024, Chinese biotech companies reached international licensing deals with multinational pharmaceutical companies totaling $52 billion; in 2025, that figure rose further to $136 billion; and in 2026, the first quarter alone reached $60 billion. Even more striking, China’s share of global innovative drug licenses was less than 5% in 2020, but by 2025 it had approached nearly half.
These figures show that Chinese companies are providing an increasing number of competitive drug candidates. Whether in oncology, immunology, metabolism, or ADCs, bispecific antibodies, cell therapy, and small-molecule targeted drugs, Chinese companies are no longer just low-cost executors—they have become part of the global pool of innovative drug assets.
This raises a real-world problem: if U.S. policy forcibly cuts off or raises the cost of cooperation with China, U.S. pharmaceutical companies may not be able to find alternative systems with the same efficiency, price, and maturity in the short term. Large pharma may have the capacity to adjust supply chains, but many early-stage biotechs may not be able to bear the costs of supplier switching, clinical delays, and CMC rework.
Thus, the alternative view within the U.S. industry is: "restricting China" should not be mistaken for "strengthening the U.S." Restricting competitors will not automatically lower U.S. domestic R&D costs, nor will it automatically improve FDA review efficiency, nor will it automatically solve the problems of research funding, talent flow, and capital market contraction.
WuXi AppTec: A Microcosm of the U.S. Rift
WuXi AppTec is the most typical case of this schism. On one hand, it has been repeatedly placed by some U.S. policy forces into the national security discussion framework; on the other, it is a widely used CDMO and CRO with a deep client base in the global drug R&D outsourcing system.
WuXi AppTec emphasizes that it is an independently listed company serving partners in more than 30 countries worldwide. It also notes that in 2025, the company received more than 50 inspections from U.S., European, and other regulatory agencies, as well as hundreds of client audits. For pharmaceutical companies, these regulatory inspections and client audits are not decorative information—they are important criteria for judging whether an outsourcing partner can undertake drug development and manufacturing projects.
The problem is that if the U.S. government changes the business fate of a globally important service provider based solely on lists and allegations, the impact will not be limited to WuXi AppTec itself. Many U.S., European, and Asian pharmaceutical companies may face contract restructuring, technology transfer, supplier replacement, and development cycle delays. For projects that have already entered late-stage clinical trials or are preparing for commercial production, replacing a CDMO is often not simply a matter of switching suppliers—it involves process validation, analytical method transfer, validation batches, quality system rebuilds, and regulatory communications.
This is also the core of the opposition within the U.S. industry. It is not asking the U.S. to abandon national security reviews, but rather demanding that reviews have transparent standards, clear evidence, and appeal procedures. Otherwise, companies cannot determine the boundaries of risk and can only treat all Chinese-origin services as potential uncertainties. As a result, the efficiency of the global outsourcing system will decline, and drug development costs will rise.
The WuXi AppTec case is important precisely because it directly juxtaposes the two attitudes within the U.S.: the political side wants to manage risk through lists, while the industry side fears that the lists themselves create new risks.
China’s Innovative Drugs: Why the U.S. Can’t Let Go
If WuXi AppTec represents the controversy over the outsourcing supply chain, then China’s innovative drug out-licensing represents a deeper change. The U.S. anxiety about Chinese biomedicine is not just about outsourcing dependence—it is about the fear that Chinese companies are becoming a global source of innovative drugs.
In the past, Chinese pharmaceutical companies were seen more as players in generics, follow-on innovation, and the local market. But in recent years, multinational pharmaceutical companies have frequently introduced assets from Chinese companies, changing this perception. Many deals are not about mature products, but about early-stage pipelines, platform technologies, and global rights. Multinationals are willing to pay substantial upfront payments and milestone payments, indicating that these assets have entered the core view of global R&D decision-making.
For example, in the ADC field, Chinese companies have become a global hotspot for transactions. Multiple Chinese ADC assets have been licensed in by multinational pharmaceutical companies to bolster their oncology pipelines. Similar trends have emerged in metabolism, immuno-inflammation, bispecific antibodies, and other areas. For large pharmaceutical companies, the appeal of Chinese assets lies not only in their relatively controllable pricing, but also in their fast development speed, broad target coverage, and rapid generation of early clinical data.
This explains why a contradiction has emerged between policy and industry within the U.S. The policy side wants to reduce China’s influence in global biomedicine, but the industry side keeps acknowledging the value of Chinese assets through transactions. If a market were not attractive, there would be no need for repeated legislative restrictions; it is precisely because Chinese innovative drug assets are increasingly needed by multinational companies that restrictions have become ever more intense.
U. S. concerns about Chinese biomedicine have gradually expanded from "supply chain security" to "innovation center competition." This is the root of the current attitudinal schism.
If China were only a low-cost manufacturing base, the U.S. could address the issue through supply chain diversification; if China were only a clinical execution base, the U.S. could control risks by raising data standards. But if China begins to continuously export drug candidates, clinical data, and technology platforms, the U.S. can no longer define the problem merely as outsourcing security—it must face a more difficult question: whether the center of global innovative drug R&D is becoming multipolar.
China’s share of global innovative drug licenses rose from less than 5% in 2020 to nearly half by 2025—a rate of change sufficient in itself to reshape U.S. policy imagination. For members of Congress, this may mean that U.S. capital, U.S. pharmaceutical companies, and the U.S. market are helping China’s biopharma industry grow; for pharmaceutical companies, however, it means that the global logic of asset discovery has already changed, and China is already an innovation source that cannot be ignored.
Thus, neither of the two attitudes within the U.S. is accidental. The hardliners see industrial competition and national security risks; the industry sees R&D efficiency, project advancement, and business reality. The former care more about whether China will become stronger; the latter care more about whether U.S. companies will become slower, more expensive, and weaker as a result.
Strengthening the Adversary Will Only Make China Stronger
The real problem for the U.S. is that restricting China is a relatively cheap policy tool, while rebuilding America’s own competitiveness requires long-term investment. Improving FDA early-stage clinical review efficiency, reducing Phase I clinical costs, stabilizing NIH research funding, attracting global scientists, improving visa policies, and supporting domestic manufacturing capacity—all of these require budgets, institutional reform, and long-term political commitment.
By contrast, adding companies to lists, expanding investment reviews, restricting clinical data, and raising supply chain compliance requirements are politically easier ways to project a tough stance and gain short-term attention. But these measures will not solve the problems of high U.S. domestic R&D costs, slow clinical execution, and talent attrition.
The FDA’s recent push for early-stage clinical pilots aimed at shortening development timelines by 6 to 12 months shows that U.S. regulators are also aware of efficiency issues. The Biotechnology Innovation Organization’s push to reduce early-stage development costs also shows that the industry does not believe the current U.S. system is sufficiently efficient. In other words, the U.S. is not blind to these problems—it is simply that "restricting China" is easier, and "reforming itself" is harder.
Conclusion: America’s China Problem Is Ultimately America’s Own Industrial Problem
After Biosecure, the U.S. discussion on Chinese biomedicine has not reached a consensus but has become even more fractured. Hardliners in Congress believe that the rise of Chinese biomedicine already constitutes strategic competition and that restrictions must continue to expand; industry and some policy researchers believe that decoupling itself cannot improve U.S. competitiveness, and that excessive restrictions may harm U.S. companies, startups, and the global R&D outsourcing system.
Behind this schism lies the fact that the global biopharma landscape has already changed. Chinese companies are both supply chain participants that the U.S. wants to reduce dependence on and sources of innovative assets that multinational pharmaceutical companies still need; they are viewed both as policy risks and repeatedly validated by the market for their commercial value. The more the U.S. tries to cut off China, the more it finds that China is already embedded in the global drug R&D, manufacturing, and transaction system.
In the coming years, U.S. restrictions on Chinese biomedicine will most likely continue to escalate. But what will truly determine the outcome of the competition may not be how many restriction lists the U.S. can produce, but whether it can make its own innovation system more efficient, more open, and more attractive again. Restricting China can change the competitive environment, but it cannot substitute for building one’s own capabilities. For the U.S., the Chinese biomedicine problem is ultimately not a simple foreign policy issue, but an internal one about its own industrial efficiency and innovation ecosystem.
Du Mu wrote in Ode to Afang Palace: "It was the six kingdoms that destroyed themselves, not Qin; it was Qin that destroyed itself, not the world." To comprehend and apply such profound philosophy, a history of just over two hundred years may prove rather challenging.